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The underlying model analyzes the first time foreign market entry decision of a representative 
investor who can choose between export and FDI. The model combines the proximity-
concentration trade-off framework with the real option methodology and sheds light on the 
effects of productivity growth. On the basis of a Geometric Brownian motion, three different 
productivity scenarios are considered (no growth, deterministic growth, uncertain growth) and 
opposed to each other. The introduction of productivity growth increases the likeliness of first 
time market entry through FDI. If the firm is confronted with uncertain productivity growth, 
market entry through FDI increases even further. Uncertainty is identified as a compounding 
force for the derived growth effects. The findings contribute to the static general equilibrium 
models which neglect intertemporal selection effects. 
JEL Code: F17, F21, F23. 






Chair in International Economics 






   
July 2009 
I would like to thank Wilhelm Kohler who supported my research in ample ways. 
Furthermore, I am profoundly indebted to Davide Sala, who provided invaluable comments. 
Thanks are due to Philipp Schröder for inviting me to Denmark, where I developed my basic 
ideas further. I have benefited from comments of participants on the CESifo Summer Institute 
Conference "Operating Uncertainty Using Real Options". In particular, I thank Giuseppe 
Bertola and Thomas Gries. I am grateful for CESifo's financial sponsorship. Uncertain Productivity Growth 1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
The explanation of international economic integration has been a core eld of economic research
for decades. Development and welfare disparities between countries (regions) have been ana-
lyzed empirically and theoretically, whereas in both disciplines trade has been considered as the
balancing force between unbalanced economic entities. Until the late 70s two major theoreti-
cal frameworks have dominated the analysis of international trade in goods. According to the
Ricardian models (see e.g. Dornbusch et al., 1977), countries are involved into trade due to dier-
ences in their production technologies, and through trade in goods, they can improve their welfare
state (gains from trade). The second inuential explanation for observed goods ows has been the
Heckscher-Ohlin framework according to which countries trade due to dierent relative endow-
ments (see e.g. Heckscher and Ohlin, 1991). Within these commonly accepted and widespread
models, international trade is motivated by comparative advantages either in technologies or in
relative factor endowments. However, in none of these concepts the rm as a microeconomic
entity plays a role, since dierences are analyzed on the basis of sectors. This negligence of rm
behavior both empirically and theoretically can be partly explained by the simple unavailability
of appropriate data at the time of the model creation.
However, with the 1970s the perception of global economic integration has started to change.
Besides the steady growth of international trade ows (averagely 5.6%), economists recognized
the extraordinary surge in global investment behavior of multinational enterprises. Starting in
the late 1970s foreign direct investments (FDI) have shown an average annual growth rate of
17.7% until 2000 (Navaretti and Venables, 2004). The rising awareness of multinational invest-
ment behavior incited a dogmatic change in the theoretical explanation of international economic
integration. The rst seminal work which introduces rm behavior into the trade context has
been presented by Krugman (1979). In his so-called New-Trade Theory, rms are modeled in
a Dixit-Stiglitz framework and represent the source of international trade due to increasing re-
turns to scale technologies. Within this rst generation of monopolistic competition models, rm
heterogeneity does not play a role since the major objective has been the explanation of intra-
industry trade as such, which was not explicable within the classical models (Krugman, 1980).
In the Krugman Model all rms export once trade is introduced.
Sensitized by the New-Trade theory and due to the increasing availability of commensurate data
about international rm behavior, a broad range of various theoretical and empirical analyses
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with a stronger focus on multinational enterprises emerged in the 1980s. Besides the attempt to
explain more complex export patterns, FDI started to be implemented into the new theoretical
frameworks. Among them are Horstman and Markusen (1987), Markusen and Venables (1998,
2000), Brainard (1993), Helpman (1984, 1985), Ethier and Markusen (1996), and Ehtier (1986).
A common ground within these models is the elaboration of the relationship between xed and
variable costs as one fundamental determinant, whether a rm starts to export or becomes a for-
eign direct investor (horizontal FDI). One specic assumption about the cost structure of rms
and the resulting international rm behavior has been summarized as the proximity-concentration
trade-o framework (Brainard 1993, 1997). Within this framework, rms are considered to be
confronted with higher xed costs in the FDI mode relative to the export mode, if they intend
to enter a new market. Due to the xed costs, rms possess increasing returns to scale in both
market entry strategies. Simultaneously the export mode is assumed to exhibit higher variable
costs relative to the FDI strategy since transport costs and other barriers add to the domestic
production costs. As a result, the extent of scale eects in the two entry modes dier with re-
spect to the state variables (quantity, goods price, productivity etc.). A strong signicance of the
proximity-concentration trade-o framework has been depicted empirically by Brainard (1997)
for 27 countries on the industry level. Since then, the proximity-concentration hypothesis, as it
is also referred to, has been established as a workhorse which explains export and FDI patterns.
The latest theoretical breakthrough in explaining the international rm behavior has been achieved
by the so called New New Trade Theories, based on the seminal work of Melitz (2003), which was
extended by Helpman et al. in 2004. Since empirical studies from the 1990s (Bernhard and Jensen,
1995; Doms and Jensen, 1998) and subsequently point out that dierences in rm productivity
lead to a rm distribution within an industry, in which not all rms export or become foreign
direct investors (Greenaway and Kneller, 2007), the New Trade Theory appears to be limited for
deeper explanation. Helpman et al. (2004) give consideration to these new empirical insights
by introducing rm heterogeneity within an industry. The authors overcome the limitation of
the standard monopolistic competition models (symmetric rms within a sector) by introducing
the proximity-concentration hypothesis and by implementing productivity uncertainty. Figure
1 demonstrates the common result of this literature strand in which the most productive rms
within a sector will be foreign direct investors, less productive ones will export and the least
productive ones will serve only the home market conditional on survival. The sector-specic rm











Figure 1: Firm distribution and productivity
distribution is a result of a lottery in which rms experience their nal productivity level after
paying the market entry costs. The model has been tested in various empirical works (Girma
et al., 2005; Wagner, 2006), and its core predictions are well reected in the data (Helpman,
2006). Helpman et al. (2004) e.g. analyze U.S. exports and aliate data based on a Pareto
distribution for ex ante uncertainty, covering 38 countries and 52 manufacturing sectors and are
able to identify the signicance of the relationship between productivity and the mode of serving
a new foreign market. The New New Trade Theory emphasizes that the rm distribution within
an industry is not a random sample. In steady-state, productivity turns out to be an appropriate
variable to explain the selection eects within an industry. However, within this new workhorse
theory it is dicult to derive transition predictions, especially on how the rms select their mar-
ket entry mode. Helpman et al. (2004) introduce productivity uncertainty as a one-time shock
eect which determines the nal rm distribution.
On the other hand, from a microeconomic perspective, rms base their market entry decision on
intertemporal prot maximization. Within this optimization calculus, productivity uncertainty
is not considered as a one time exogenous phenomenon but as a continuous aspect.
Faggio et al. (2007) e.g. present empirical data about the development of total factor productivity
(TFP) for dierent sectors and for the whole economy in the U.K., starting in 1984. The authors
show that besides a steady growth of TFP in the last decade, furthermore productivity dispersion
in dierent sectors has increased. Bloom et al. 2007 show additionally that rm productivity
exhibits a steady but volatile growth over time.
Given these insights, decision makers posses at least an expectation about their intertemporal
productivity development in their home and foreign country. Based on historical experiences or
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on market analysis they anticipate a specic development of prospective productivity and decide
on an appropriate market entry mode. Indeed, in the long run the self-selection within a sector
will be based on survival arguments which can be modeled by a static productivity uncertainty
as in Helpman et al. (2004). Still, the question remains whether it is appropriate to neglect the
continuous volatile motion of rm productivity, especially if rst time market entry modes are
modeled.
In contrast to trade models, modern nance theory analyzes investment behavior by combining
continuous uncertainty with xed costs in an intertemporal framework (McDonald and Siegel,
1986; Pindyck, 1991). This strand of literature is known as the real option approach and has
been extended among others by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Although the theoretical framework
turns out to be relatively complex, the approach is increasingly used by decision makers to assess
enterprise strategies, especially in investment related questions (Leslie and Michaels, 1997). To
shed light on the question whether continuous productivity uncertainty has a dierent impact
on the export and FDI decision of an investor, the real option approach represents therefore a
promising and appropriate framework.
The following model combines the proximity-concentration trade-o framework with an uncer-
tain productivity growth (Geometric Brownian motion) to analyze the rst time foreign market
entry strategy of an investor who can choose between export and FDI. In order to work out the
specic dierences between a static and dynamic theoretical framework the analysis is conducted
in three progressive steps. Starting from a framework without productivity growth, conditions
for the optimal market entry mode are derived. In a second step productivity is assumed to grow
deterministically, which leads to a broader set of choices for the investor as he can postpone his
investment decision. Finally, productivity growth is modeled as a stochastic process accounting
for the most realistic scenario.
Results of the model support the New New Trade Theory ndings, as continuous uncertainty
provides implicitly the same market entry patterns. Confronted with continuous risk, a rm will
enter a new foreign market through exports at lower productivity levels relative to the FDI mode.
Additionally, the model allows a deeper understanding of the chosen market entry mode under
continuous productivity uncertainty.
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2 Theoretical Framework
Several assumptions are introduced in order to elaborate essential eects of uncertain productivity
growth on the choice of the optimal market entry mode.1
Consider a risk neutral investor who can serve a new foreign market with a specic product brand
Xi either through exports, produced in the home country or through a new foreign aliate plant
(horizontal FDI), located in the destination country. These two market entry modes represent
investment strategies which are substituting channels to sell Xi on the new market. The nal
decision on how to enter the foreign market is based on the comparison of the export investment
value VE with the alternative FDI strategy value VF. The investment horizon is assumed to be
innite and market entry can be postponed without any negative eects on revenues.
2.1 Demand Side















; 0 <  < 1; 0 <  < 1;
where Qt represents a dierentiated product with nt varieties. Xit is the consumed amount of
brand i only produced by the considered investor.  represents the degree of substitution between
any two brands of Qt. Yt is a homogeneous composite good, freely traded and therefore, used as
numeraire good with a normalized xed world market price, equal to unity. The foreign household
maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint
nt X
i=1
Xitpit + Yt 5 t (2)
where t represents the foreign country's total expenditure and pit the price of variety i in t. The
1 The term uncertainty will be used in an interchangeable manner with the term risk. In a concise way, risk refers
to a known probability distribution whereas uncertainty is referring to events in which the numerical probabilities
cannot be specied. In this paper I do not follow this distinction.
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where Pt denotes the foreign country's price index and  the elasticity substitution. The investor
insinuates that the expenditure share  spent on Q and the price index P do not change over
time. Therefore, equation (3) represents the investor's perceived demand function and the inverse










where the considered variety's subscript i is omitted, as the investor intends to serve the foreign
market only with this distinctive brand. Furthermore, there is no strategic interaction among
rms. Depending on the country specic elasticity of substitution, the investor possesses a varying









with w as the equilibrium wage rate, results from the investor's prot maximization problem as




the inverse demand function can be reformulated as
p = ZX 1: (6)
In a country, where  is close to 0, the elasticity of demand is close to 1 which represents a
scenario where the investor has a high monopoly power, since the substitutability between the
varieties of good Qt is very low ( ! 0). In contrast, for a country with  close to 1, the elasticity
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of demand approaches innity and the substitutability between the varieties of Qt is very high
( ! 1). In such a country the investor is confronted with a perfectly competitive environment.
As a result of this modied notation,  can be used as a country specic competition measure
for a variety X.
2.2 Production Side
In both, the home and foreign country, the investor is confronted with a production technology
characterized by the Cobb-Douglas function
Xt(Lt) = #tL
t (7)
with 0 <  < 1 and #t > 0;
where Xt denotes the periodical output and labor Lt the only input factor. #t represents a
productivity parameter and is referred to as the rm embedded productivity, because it is specic
to the idiosyncratic rm independently of its location. In both market entry strategies the investor
is confronted with xed costs which are assumed to be sunk once invested. If the foreign market
is served through exports, xed costs IE accrue. They include costs for the domestic production
extension and expenses for a new foreign distribution and service network. In case of a FDI
market entry mode xed costs IF must be covered which include the same distribution and
service network costs as the export mode. However, due to the required new plant in the FDI
mode, its xed costs are assumed to be always higher than the export xed costs IE.2 Given
these irreversible xed costs, both investment strategies exhibit increasing returns to scale.
Additionally, exports are subject to iceberg transport costs described by the transport technology
() =    1 with  > 1: (8)
The extra domestic output XDEt, which is produced only for the new foreign market, shrinks
during the transportation process by the constant factor (  1). The residual output XEt which
2 A switching strategy from the export to the FDI mode, which would be associated with a dierent xed cost
structure, is assumed to be not possible. In a dynamic framework such an extension necessitates numerical methods
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
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Transport costs are avoided if the investor decides to serve the foreign market through a new
aliate. The wage rate w is determined in the homogeneous good industry Y , where the for-
eign country exhibits a lower wage rate than the investor's home country due to a less ecient









is the proximity-concentration trade-o assumption, which is fundamental in recent trade models
dealing with international market entry strategies and represents the rst crucial pillar in the
underlying model (Brainard, 1997, Helpman et al., 2004, and Yeaple, 2008).
2.3 The Evolution of Productivity
The major objective within the established theoretical framework is the analysis of rm-embedded
productivity, introduced as #t, and its impact on the optimal market entry mode under dierent
scenarios. Therefore, a more accurate coverage of possible productivity developments is necessary.
From a theoretical point of view productivity can evolve in three dierent manners over time.
1. # stays constant over time (no productivity growth).
2. # constantly increases over time (deterministic productivity growth).
3. # exhibits a volatile productivity increase over time (stochastic productivity growth).
Analytically, these productivity evolutions can be easily modeled by using the following Geometric
Brownian motion denoted in dierential notation as
d#t = #tdt + #tdzt; (11)
where the parameters  and  are assumed to be time invariant and represent the growth rate
and extent of volatility, respectively. dzt is the increment of a standard Brownian motion zt with
dzt = t
p
dt and t  N(0;1) (12)
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where t is assumed to be a Gaussian random variable. Therefore, the expected value and the
variance of the standard Wiener process' increment result as E(dzt) = 0 and V(dzt) = dt.




































Figure 2: Exemplary Productivity Paths
Figure 2 illustratively depicts the realizations of the above mentioned productivity paths. The
increasing dashed line exhibits a yearly growth rate of 6% and no volatility as E(dzt) = 0. In
such a case after 5 years, productivity can be expected to be 33% higher than initially. For a
volatile productivity growth with  > 0, it is no longer possible to predict a unique path. The
dotted trajectories represent 2 potential developments for a scenario with  = 4% out of innite
possibilities. The simplest case is depicted by the horizontal curve which represents a scenario
without growth.3
Due to its coverage of all possible productivity developments, the Geometric Brownian motion in
equation (11) represents the second pillar in this model. By combining the established proximity-
concentration trade-o framework with the Geometric Brownian motion in productivity, the
succeeding analysis examines the optimal rst time market entry strategy of an international
investor in all these scenarios separately.
3 The chosen values are illustrative examples. Faggio et al. (2007) e.g. present empirical data about productivity
developments for dierent sectors in the U.K.
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3 The Optimal Market Entry Mode
In order to elaborate uncertainty eects of productivity growth on the choice between FDI and
export, the analysis starts with the simplest scenario with no productivity changes over time.
Successively, the complexity of the analysis is increased by introducing a deterministic growth
case and nally by considering the most realistic scenario represented by equation (11). This
stepwise approach permits an identication of the additional eects associated with extensions.
3.1 FDI or Export without Productivity Growth
In a scenario without any productivity growth equation (11) reduces to d#t = 0 and the investor
will determine the optimal market entry mode based on the current state of observations, as there
are no expected productivity changes in the future. Empirically, it is dicult to identify such an
industry or variety in the long run but in some sectors like in the textile industry, technology has
reached its marginal productivity frontier temporarily, and one can assume nearly zero growth
rates, at least in the short run. From a theoretical point of view, this scenario only represents a
starting point for further analysis.
In the export mode the investor's expected periodical prots (cash-ows) E are derived from
the following maximization problem
E = max
L
p XE   wEL s.t. XE =
XDE

s.t. XDE = #L s.t. p = ZXE
( 1): (13)
Optimal periodical labor demand L
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Finally, the optimal expected periodical export cash-ows are given as
E(#) = ME#
E (16)














Transport costs do not accrue in the FDI mode ( = 1) and expected periodical prots result as4
F(#) = MF# (17)












Cash-ows in both entry modes can be linear, convex, or concave in # depending on . The
following analysis focuses on cases in which the cash-ows are linear or convex in # since this is
a common assumption in recent trade models (Helpman, 2006).5
In order to choose the optimal market entry mode, the investor compares both market entry
strategies' net present investment values which are associated with the earlier explained xed
costs. The opportunity costs in this certain scenario are equal to the riskless interest rate r and
therefore, net present values of the export and FDI mode result as








Figure 3 depicts the export strategy's investment value as a continuous line and the FDI mode's
value as a dotted line.6 The two curves' relative position to each other is not random but enforced
by the proximity-concentration trade-o assumption. As the xed costs in the export mode are
assumed to be lower than in the FDI mode (comparative xed cost advantage), for # = 0 the net
investment value VE   IE will always be higher than VF   IF. Furthermore, due to the higher
variable costs in the export mode a gain in productivity leads to a higher marginal increase in the
FDI investment value (comparative variable cost advantage). Dierently expressed, the slope of


















5 Cash-ows will be always linear or convex in # for   1.
6 The domestic investment value VD of the plant which serves the investor's home market is neglected. Implicitly, it
is assumed that VD is not aected by the new foreign market entry.
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VF   IF will always be steeper than the slope of VE   IE. As a result, the export value function
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Figure 3: Investment Values within the Proximity-Concentration Trade-O
an investor will serve the new foreign market through FDI if the prevailing productivity level is
larger than #Fc1 and for a productivity level between #Ec and #Fc exporting turns out to be the
optimal market entry strategy. For the remaining productivity range, market entry implies losses
in both modes and is therefore discarded.
A decisive aspect whether the FDI strategy dominates the export mode or vice versa depends on














Figure 3 illustratively depicts a case in which the intersection between the two value functions
takes place above the horizontal-axes. However, for a cost structure with export xed costs IE
close to FDI xed costs, the two value functions may intersect on or below the horizontal axes.
In such a case, only the FDI strategy provides relevant zero or positive net present values and it
would represent the upper envelope function in gure 3. Simultaneously, its cut-o productivity
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level #
Fc will be always equal to or below #
Ec. Consequently, for such cost constellations FDI
represents the only and optimal market entry strategy conditional on positive net present values.
It is possible to derive a concise condition which describes the ordinal rank between the two

















Within the assumed relative cost structure, relation (21) states that the export mode's produc-
tivity cut-o #
Ec is smaller (equal, bigger) than the FDI productivity cut-o #
Fc if its xed cost














Market entry always through FDI
(conditional on positive net present value V
F−I
F)
Market entry through FDI or export
















Figure 4: Relative Cost Constellations within the Proximity-Concentration Trade-O
the proximity-concentration trade-o framework relative xed costs IE








never exceed unity, it is possible to depict all relevant cost patterns in a unit rel-
ative cost box. The diagonal curve in Figure 4 represents all relative cost constellations for the
FDI and export mode which exhibit a comparative xed cost advantage equal to the compara-
tive variable cost advantage, given the technology concavity  and the country specic degree of
competition . Therefore, any relative cost structure on or above the diagonal line leads to a
FDI productivity cut-o #
Fc being equal to or bigger than #
Ec. In both cases the FDI mode's
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net present value function would represent the upper envelope in gure 3 and the investor serves
the market through a foreign plant, conditional on a positive net present value. Any relative cost
constellation below the diagonal curve in gure 4 leads to a cut-o rank with #
Ec always lower
than #
Fc which would be represented by an upper envelope function in gure 3 consisting of both,
the FDI and export mode's net present value functions. Therefore, in such a case the optimal
market entry strategy depends on the current observed productivity state # and can be either
FDI or exporting. The investor will choose the export mode if the observed current productivity
level # lies in-between the two productivity cut-os #
Ec;#Fc1 and fullls the following condition








An essential result in the underlying scenario with no growth and no uncertainty is that 50% of
all possible relative cost structures (upper left corner in gure 4) unambiguously entail FDI as
the optimal market entry strategy, conditional on positive net present values. Furthermore, the
export mode never becomes a unique dominant strategy as the lower left corner in gure 4 can
lead to both export and FDI.
Result 1:
Given IE < IF and wF < wE
1
, for more than 50% of all possible relative cost constellations
within the proximity-concentration trade-o framework, FDI represents the unique optimal mar-
ket entry mode.
The upper horizontal margin in gure 4 typies relative cost constellation for which the xed
costs in both market entry modes are equal, but the variable costs are always lower in the FDI
mode. Therefore, the investor will always opt for FDI. Analogously, for all cost constellations
positioned on the right vertical margin in gure 4 both market entry modes exhibit equal total
variable costs. Due to the lower xed costs in the export strategy, in such cases the investor will
always enter the market as exporter. Finally, the upper right corner in gure 4 represents a cost
constellation for which the xed cost advantage of the FDI mode is equal to the variable cost
advantage of the export mode and therefore, the investor is indierent between the two market
entry strategies.
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3.2 FDI or Export with Productivity Growth
A more realistic scenario for productivity development can be modeled as
d#t = #tdt (23)
with  representing the productivity growth rate. Given the initial exponential cash-ows in
equation (16) and (17) it is necessary to adjust the growth rate for cases in which  > 1. The
adjusted growth rate for convex prot ows results as
0 =
d#
# = : (24)
Still, without any risk, the appropriate discount rate is equal to the riskless interest rate r.





with #(s) = #
t e0s and i 2 fE;Fg: (26)
T represents the time at which periodical prots start to ow and t the time at which the cash-
ows are evaluated, with #0 representing the current productivity state. Therefore, the gross







c = r   0: (27)
In contrast to the previous scenario an investor is not only confronted with the choice problem






r   0e (r 0)T   Iie rT

; with # = #0; i 2 fE;Fg: (28)
Equation (28) clearly illustrates the unequal total discount rates of the cash-ows and the xed
costs. For  = 0 which represent the previous scenario, there is no reason to postpone or delay
7 A meaningful economic interpretation for the investment values result for r   
0 > 0. Under this condition it is
necessary that c >  > 1 with c =
r
.
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an investment. The investment takes place if the discounted prot ows are equal or bigger than
the discounted xed costs in t (Marshallian rule). The corresponding investment rule results as
Fi(#) = max[Vi(0;T)   Ii;0]: (29)
On the other hand for a growth rate  > 0 the investor has an incentive to postpone the project
in order to maximize his pay-o, although the current gross value of the cash-ow streams may
be bigger than the current xed costs. Solving the maximization problem in (28) provides the












with i 2 fE;Fg: (30)
For periodical prot ows not too much larger than the user cost of capital rIi, both investment
strategies will be postponed into the future since T
i > 0. Due to the proximity-concentration
trade-o assumption the optimal market entry time of exporting clearly diers from the optimal
market entry time of the FDI strategy. For the sake of a better comparability between the
dierent scenarios it is useful to determine the optimal productivity cut-os #
i in both investment
strategies. By setting the optimal investment time T
i equal to zero it is possible to derive the
investment rule and the optimal cut-o productivity #
i which triggers market entry at t = 0,
respectively. An instantaneous investment in both modes results if
rIi = (r   0)
Mi#
(r   0)
= Mi# with i 2 fE;Fg (31)
which states that the investor will execute one of the two investment alternatives if the corre-
sponding cash-ows Mi# cover their cost of capital use rIi. This optimality condition is known
as the Jorgensonian investment rule (Jorgenson, 1963) and slightly diers from the generally ap-
plied Marshallian rule, which compares the absolute xed costs with the gross investment values.
By contrast Jorgenson's rule represents a marginal concept and in the presence of productivity
growth, it leads to an investment rule where xed costs need not only to be covered by the gross
present value Vi(#) but by relatively higher values.
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r   0 > 1 (32)
where the wedge in front of the xed costs is bigger than one, if  > 0. Therefore, in absence
of productivity growth (earlier scenario) the derived condition coincides with the Marshallian
investment rule and no timing problem occurs. On the other hand, for positive productivity
growth rates the investor will postpone his market entry decision (export or FDI) into the future
T
i although the net payos are positive.
For a market entry in T

















and are referred to as the option values. Clearly, for  = 0 these value functions become worthless.
Given the two possible investment times (ti = 0;T
i ) for each market entry strategy the investor

















i and c =
r

the two value functions which determine each market entry mode's optimal timing, result as
Fi(#) = Aic#c for #i < #
i postpone investment to T
i (34)
Vi(#)   Ii for #i > #
i invest today (t = 0) (35)
with i 2 fE;Fg;
where the cut-o productivity levels are represented by #
i.
The existence of productivity growth ( > 0) has two new eects on the market entry choice of the
investor. Equation (27) demonstrates that the gross present value of both investments increases in
. In comparison to the previous scenario, the investor is confronted with lower productivity cut-
os as the net present value functions increase. However, simultaneously growth in productivity
generates an option value represented by (33) which eliminates this eect completely, as the
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investments are postponed. A graphical illustration visualizes the dierent adjustments very





















































Figure 5: Value Functions of Exporting and FDI
both market entry strategies in the presence of productivity growth, whereas the dashed lines
represent the corresponding option values. If the investor decides on the market entry problem
by applying the Marshallian rule, the optimal investment strategy is derived in the same manner
as in a scenario without growth. In such a case for current productivity levels higher than #0
F,
FDI represents the optimal mode. Exporting is chosen for current productivity levels between
#0
E and #0
F. These cut-os are all lower than those in scenario one as explained and would
cause an earlier market entry in both strategies. However, for the determination of the optimal
productivity cut-os the investor additionally accounts for the option values as there is a timing
problem. In contrast to scenario one, these optimal cut-os result at the tangency point between
the net present investment value function and the respective option value. At these points for each
market entry mode, the net investment value equals its option value, respectively, and the investor
does no longer postpone his investment decision. Rearranging the earlier derived Jorgensonian
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c = r   0: (36)
The dierence between the interest rate r and the productivity growth rate 0 represents the real
opportunity cost rate c. For a low productivity growth rate the opportunity costs of delaying
each investment are high, whereas a high growth rate aects 0
c negatively.
In the illustrative example in gure 5 exporting is in principle protable for a current productivity
level between #0
E and #
E if it is started instantaneously (t=0) but by starting in T
E the net present
prots represented by the option value FE(#) are higher. Therefore, exporting is postponed until
the current productivity level reaches #
E at which the investor is indierent between postponing
and investing into the export platform. Consequently, as long as there is a positive dierence
between the option value Fi(#) and the net present value Vi(#) Ii there exists a value of waiting
and the market entry is postponed into T
i . Due to the same reasoning, for productivity levels
between #0
F and #
F, the investor postpones his FDI investment decision into T
F, although an
immediate market entry would provide prots. Graphically expressed, it is the upper envelope
function in gure 5 which determines the nal optimal market entry mode.
Generally, the determination of the optimal market entry mode necessitates the consideration
of two aspects. First, the investor needs again to determine the ordinal rank between the two
productivity cut-os.

















which is the same result as in scenario one.
The conclusion from this equivalent results is that the introduction of growth into the proximity-
concentration trade-o framework does not change the relationship between the productivity
cut-os compared to the previous scenario. Figure 6 depicts the earlier introduced relative unit
cost box within the proximity-concentration trade-o framework. The rank of the productivity
cut-os for all possible relative cost constellations is the same as in gure 4.
In order to derive the optimal market entry strategy, it is necessary to determine how the two
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Market entry through export or FDI
C
2
Figure 6: Relative Cost Constellations and Productivity Growth
Relation (38) is almost equal to the rst condition in relation (37) except the second term on the
right hand side which depends on the growth rate . Therefore, it can be drawn as dashed line in
the previous relative unit cost box. Within the proximity-concentration trade-o framework, for
all relative cost constellations on the dash line, the two market entry strategies' option functions
coincide. Respectively, any cost structure above the line will exhibit a FDI option value FF(#)
which is always bigger than the export option value FE(#). The opposite holds for cost constel-
lations below the dashed line. Based on the two conditions (37) and (38) it is possible to derive
the optimal market entry modes for dierent cost constellations presented in gure 6.
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Relative Cost Structures in Area C1:
All relative cost patterns above the diagonal line, declared as area C1, will lead to a FDI pro-
ductivity cut-o #
F which is always smaller than the export cut-o #
E. Simultaneously, the FDI
mode's option function will always be higher than the export mode's one with
FF(#) > FE(#) and #
F < #
E: (39)
Therefore, in gure 5 the upper envelope function is always represented either through the FDI's
option or net present value function. Consequently, for all these cost constellations an investor
will unambiguously serve the foreign market through FDI, conditional on market entry.
Relative Cost Structures in Area C2:
For cost constellations in area C2 the relation between the two option functions and productivity
cut-os is given by
FF(#) < FE(#) and #
F > #
E: (40)
For these cost patterns gure 5 would map an upper envelope function consisting of all four avail-
able value functions. Depending on the current state of the productivity level the investor enters
the market either through exports or FDI. Therefore, area C2 does not lead to an unambiguous
market entry strategy.
Relative Cost Structures in Area C3:
Relative cost structures between the diagonal line and above the dash line are declared as area
C3 and lead to a formation of the option value functions and productivity cut-os with
FF(#) > FE(#) and #
F < #
E: (41)
For these constellations the investor is in principle willed to enter the new foreign market through
exports at lower productivity levels relative to the FDI mode. However, as the option value of the
FDI mode is always higher than the two export value functions, exporting is always neglected for
the sake of FDI. Figure 5 illustratively represents such a cost constellation and it can be shown
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Area C3 evolves for positive growth rates and its extent depends on the size of . Condition (38)
shows for a decreasing  the exponent 
c approaches zero. Consequently, area C3 diminishes
until the dashed line in gure 5 coincides with the diagonal curve. This result represents the
relative unit cost box for scenario one with  = 0 and conrms the consistency of the framework.
On the contrary, an increase in  enlarges area C3 as the dashed curve in gure 5 becomes more
convex. The economic intuition for this adjustments follows from condition (38). An increase
in productivity growth reduces the comparative xed cost advantage of the export mode and
implicitly increases the comparative variable cost advantage of the FDI strategy. Dierently
expressed, a rise in  increases the FDI mode's option value stronger than the export option
value. Consequently, as area C1 and C3 unambiguously enforce market entry through FDI it can
be concluded that within the proximity-concentration trade-o framework a rise in  increases
the range of cost patterns which result in FDI.
Result 2:
For IE < IF and wE
1
 > wF the availability of productivity growth increases the range of
relative cost constellation which enforce FDI as the optimal market entry strategy. The higher
the growth rate  the larger the share of cost patterns which lead to FDI (far more than 50% ).
Even though the underlying framework only considers a representative rm, the last result has
crucial implications for sectoral rst time market entry investments. Accordingly, sectors with
higher productivity growth should exhibit a higher share of FDI as rst time entry mode, since
the range of relative cost constellations which promote FDI is relatively larger.
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3.3 FDI or Export with Uncertain Productivity Growth
Although the introduction of productivity growth accounts for empirically important eects still
one crucial aspect is neglected. Productivity growth is not a deterministic phenomenon but
represents a continuously volatile process over time (Baily et al., 2001). As a consequence of
this stochastic characteristic, the investor is no longer confronted with a simple choice problem
between two types of market entry over time. Additionally, he has to adjust his expectations
to the prevailing continuous productivity uncertainty. A natural and convenient way to extend
the previous settings, in order to account for productivity uncertainty, is the introduction of a
Geometric Brownian motion represented by (11) whose solution is derived as






Within this nal framework the investor assesses any uncertain investment with respect to the
capital market where an appropriate return (including a risk-premium) is derived. In order
to evaluate the appropriate investment return for both market entry modes it is assumed that
there exists an asset on a complete capital market which is perfectly correlated with the latter
Geometric Brownian motion.8 Furthermore, this replication asset is assumed to pay no dividends
and therefore, its complete return can be attributed to its capital gain. With reference to the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) the risk adjusted expected return  of such an investment
is derived from




where cM species the correlation between the spanned asset and the market portfolio. rM and
M represent the expected return and the volatility of the latter one. Within this framework
the market price of risk is measured as rM r
M and is referred to as the Sharpe ratio (Sharpe,
1964). Based on the linear relationship in equation (45) it is possible to derive an appropriate
risk-adjusted expected rate of return for any degree of uncertainty described by .
Once the adjusted expected return  is known, it is possible to derive the risk-adjusted opportunity
costs in order to evaluate the export and FDI strategy under uncertainty. In equilibrium, the
8 Within the option theory such a procedure is referred to as asset spanning or asset replication (Schwartz and
Trigeorgis, 2004)
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dierence between the risk-adjusted return  and the deterministic growth rate  represents the
rate of opportunity costs with
u =    : (46)
For a positive u, an investment exhibits an expected capital gain rate  which is lower than
the risk-adjusted rate of return . Therefore, by delaying the investment the investor incurs
an opportunity cost rate of u. Consequently, for a high opportunity cost rate the immediate
execution of the respective investment is more likely because the corresponding option value will
be low, due to a low .
Since in the underlying framework the cash-ows Mi#i increase exponentially in # for  > 1, it
is necessary to determine the corresponding risk-adjusted growth rate 0
u, which is derived as
0
u =  +
1
2
(   1)2: (47)
Therefore, for both market entry modes the expected value of the cash-ows at time t can be
calculated by
E(Mi#
t ) = Mi#
0e+ 1
2( 1)2
with i 2 fE;Fg: (48)
Equation (48) shows that for linear periodical cash-cash ows ( = 1) in #, the expected value
is independent of the parameter . The investor expects the same prots as in the previous
deterministic case. However, for  > 1 the expected prot-ows increase and are bigger the higher
the uncertainty in the productivity development becomes. This disproportionate expectation is
driven by Jensen's inequality and has a positive impact on the current gross investment value in
both market entry modes. Given the risk-adjusted growth rate 0
u the risk-adjusted total rate of
return results as
0
u = r + (   r) (49)
and the risk-adjusted discount rate can be derived as
0
u = r   (r   u)  
1
2
(   1)2: (50)
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Finally, the net present investment values of both market entry modes associated with uncertain
productivity growth result as




ute 0tdt   Ii (51)
Viu(#)   Ii =
Miu#
r   (r   u)   1
2(   1)2   Ii (52)
with # = #0 and i 2 fE;Fg:
For  = 1 and  = 0 the two net present value functions increase linearly in # and they exactly
behave as in the deterministic scenario, because the opportunity cost rates are equal (0
u = 0
c).9
However, driven by Jensen's inequality, both expected present investment values are higher than
in the previous scenario (Viu(#) > Vi(#)) if the cash-ows are convex in # and if the productivity
growth is accompanied by uncertainty ( > 0). Formally, the additional term 1
2(   1)2 ac-
counts for these additional expected gains in the investment values.
In gure 5 the two net present value functions shift to the north if productivity growth is associated
with uncertainty. Consequently, the intersection points between the horizontal axis and the
export and FDI investment value functions appear at lower productivity levels with #0
Eu and #0
Fu
representing the critical thresholds for positive values respectively for both market entry modes.
However, as in the previous scenario both market entry modes are associated with a timing
problem as the periodical cash-ows rise over time whereas the xed costs Ii are unchanged and
appear only in the rst investment period. Therefore, in order to assess whether there exits a
value of waiting, it is necessary to determine the option values of both investment strategies.
9 Equation (51) provides reasonable values if the interest rate r is strictly bigger than .
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The general functional form of the option values for both market entry strategies results as































2 < 0: (55)
The optimal cut-os #
iu and the two unknown Aiju can be determined by dening appropriate
boundary conditions. If the current productivity level # approaches zero, the option value of an
uncertain investment should also tend to zero, as the probability of a sucient increase in the
future is low. Therefore, the rst boundary condition states
Fiu(0) = 0: (56)
If the productivity level reaches the optimal cut-o level, the investor is indierent between delay-
ing the uncertain investment (keeping the option alive) and executing the project by investing the
sunk costs Ii. As a consequence, the second condition is the matching condition which captures




iu)   Ii: (57)
Finally, in order to nd an optimal threshold value for # the two functions need to be tangent in









The rst boundary condition necessitates that Ai2u = 0 as 2u is negative. Therefore, the option
functions for both market entry modes are reduced to
Fiu(#) = Aiu#u (59)
with u = 1u and i 2 fE;Fg:
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By using the remaining two conditions the option value functions result as































and i 2 fE;Fg: (61)




















These two equilibrium productivity levels dier from the previous cut-os under certainty only in
the magnitude of the two parameters 0
u and u, which are aected by the productivity uncertainty




2u(u   1) + (r   u)u   r = 0: (63)




The risk-adjusted discount rate 0
u turns out to be the negative expression of 	. For reason-
able results 0
u needs to be strictly positive. Therefore,  must lie between the two roots and
consequently, this last requirement necessitates that
u >  > 0: (65)
Based on these two relationships it is possible to analyze the underlying market entry problem as
in the previous scenarios. The ordinal rank between the two productivity cut-os is independent
of the growth rate 0
u and the extent of uncertainty . It is only inuenced by the comparative
10For  = 0 the opportunity cost rate     = u = r    = c:
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Therefore, for all relative cost constellations in gure 7, which are above the dotted line, the


































Figure 7: Relative Cost Constellations & Uncertain Productivity Growth
cut-o level for the FDI mode will always be lower than the export threshold. The opposite holds
for cost patterns below the diagonal curve. The intuition behind this result is that uncertainty
inuences both entry cut-os proportionally and does not distort the relationship which has been
derived in the deterministic case. However, for the nal entry decision it is the option values
which determine the optimal market entry mode for given cost constellations.




















which is equal to the relationship in the previous scenario except the exponent u which is risk
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which proves the consistency of the model as the result is equivalent to the previous certain case.
In gure 7 the areas F1 and F2 are equal to the areas C1 and C3 in gure 6 since they represent
the deterministic case. By taking the two relationships (64) and (65) into account the risk driven
adjustments of the option values and of equation (67) are straightforward. With an increase in
productivity uncertainty, u decreases and becomes smaller than c. Graphically, the continuous
line in gure 7 which represents relationship (67) becomes more convex as depicted by the dashed
line. As a consequence, the range of relative cost constellations which enforce FDI over time
increases by the area F3. Dierently expressed, a volatile growth in productivity broadens the
range of cost constellations favoring FDI as the rst time market entry strategy compared with
a deterministic growth development. Uncertainty therefore acts as a compound force for the
derived deterministic growth eects.
Result 3:
For IE < IF and wE
1
 > wF the range of relative cost constellations which enforce FDI as
the optimal market entry mode is strictly bigger if productivity growth d#t is associated with
uncertainty. For  ! 1, FDI becomes the only relevant market entry mode.
4 The Timing Eects of Uncertainty
The increasing dominance of the FDI mode as the optimal rst time market entry strategy due
to an increase in  implies according to the common real option theory an increase in the market
entry time (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).11 However, in contrast to the previous deterministic case
it is no longer possible to quantify the exact market entry time T
i for both market entry modes
as the investor's decision is based on a stochastic process. But, it is possible to calculate the
expected rst time entry E(T
i ), if the initial productivity level #0 and the cut-o productivity #
i
are known. The corresponding time T
i at which the stochastic process reaches its trigger value
#
i represents the rst passage time.
11Dixit and Pindyck (1994) assume in their illustrative examples that the risk adjusted return rate is invariant in 




29Uncertain Productivity Growth 4 TIMING & COMPARATIVE STATICS































which is also referred to as the Inverse Gaussian distribution.13 The Laplace transform of T
i is















































More precisely, the expected time before market entry results in both modes as (see Karatzas
and Shreve, 1991)
E(T
i (# = #
i)) =
8
> > > > > <









if  > 1
22




i > #0 and i 2 fE;Fg:
Equation (72) shows that for  2 (0;
p
2) there exists a nite market entry time. However, if
productivity growth  is lower than 1
22 or equal to zero, market entry might not be realized
since E(T
i ) diverges.14
Within the proximity-concentration trade-o framework it is again possible to derive a relation-
ship between relative xed and variable costs which determines whether the expected market
12A detailed derivation is oered by Karatzas and Shreve (1991, p.196) or by Karlin and Taylor (1975, p.363).
13The name "inverse gaussian distribution" stems form the inverse relationship between the cumulant generating
functions of these distributions and those of Gaussian distributions.
14A detailed discussion about the peculiarities of the inverse gaussian distribution can be found in Johnson, Kotz,
and Balakrishnan (1995) or Dixit (1993).
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entry time in the export mode is smaller (equal to, higher) than in the FDI mode.





















Combining this result with the previous outcomes summarized in gure 7 it can be seen that for
all relative cost constellations above the diagonal line (area F1 with #
E > #
F), the FDI mode's
expected market entry time E(T
F) is always less than in the export mode. Simultaneously,
FDI turns out to be the optimal entry strategy due to its higher option value. Inversely, for all
relative cost patterns below the diagonal line, the optimal FDI productivity cut-o strictly exceeds
the export cut-o. Therefore, if the new foreign market is served through exports, its expected
market entry will appear earlier with respect to the FDI mode. However, for all cost constellations
represented through the areas F1 and F2, which are driven by  and , the FDI option value is
strictly superior to the export option value and consequently the investor is likely to serve the
market through FDI in E(T
F), which is strictly higher than E(T
E), as illustrated by (73). Due
to the abolition of such a protable export strategy for the sake of a more protable future FDI
investment, a potential earlier expected market entry is prolonged by E(T) = E(T
F) E(T
E).
Since the prolongation of the expected market entry is caused by the negligence of a less protable
export mode over time, I refer to this rst timing eect as prolongation of market entry time by
negligence.15
Result 4:
For IE < IF and wE
1
 > wF with  > 0 and  > 0, there exists a range of relative cost
constellations which leads to a prolongation of the expected market entry time by E(T) =
E(T
F)   E(T
E), due to the negligence of a protable export mode in T
E < T
F.
15This result is based on the assumption that the initial productivity level #0 is smaller than #

i with i = fE;Fg:
For all cost constellations below the diagonal line in gure 7, the optimal market entry mode will also depend on
the current productivity level #0. If e.g. the current productivity level is above both cut-o productivity levels and
therefore enforcing FDI, there is no timing issue and no prolongation of entry time by negligence.
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By integrating the probability density function (69) it is possible to derive the corresponding




















































with #0 < #
i and i 2 fE;Fg:










































F; = 0:04;#0 = 1; = 0:1, but
FF(#) > FE(#) with  = 1










































F; = 0:04;#0 = 1; = 0:16, but
FF(#) > FE(#) with  = 1
Figure 8: Cumulative Distribution Functions of T
i .
Panel a) in gure 8 represents the cumulative distribution functions of both investment strategies
for a relative cost constellation which leads to a productivity cut-o ranking with #
E < #
F. The
vertical dashed line represents the export mode's expected market entry time and the s-shaped
curve its cumulative distribution function. The continuous curves represent the FDI mode. In
the underlying example the export mode exhibits a rst-order stochastic dominance over the FDI
strategy. Dierently expressed, for any market entry time T
i , the probability of market entry
through exports will always be higher than in the FDI case. However, for the chosen relative cost
pattern, the FDI mode exhibits a higher option value (see gure 7, areas F2;F3) and therefore
32Uncertain Productivity Growth 4 TIMING & COMPARATIVE STATICS
the investor will neglect the export market entry for the sake of the FDI mode. The distance
between E(T
F) and E(T
E) in gure 8 represents the prolongation of market entry by negligence.
Inversely, it can be concluded that for relative cost patterns which lead to a productivity cut-o
ranking with #
F < #
E, the FDI mode has a rst-order stochastic dominance over the export
mode and there will be no market entry prolongation.
By considering the partial derivative of equation (71) with respect to  it is possible to assess the




































Thus, whether a change in uncertainty results in a positive or negative eect on the expected
market entry time, decisively depends on the partial dierential on the right hand side of equation
(75). A change in uncertainty aects the optimal productivity levels #
i through two channels.








> 0 for   1: (76)
The intuition for this monotonic positive eect is that an increase in uncertainty, incentivises the
postponement of the investment decision into the future (higher #
i) in order to gain additional
information on the productivity development.
The second eect is a change in the expected investment value Vi(#) which itself depends on the
adjusted discount rate 0
u.





Summing up theses two eects, in this particular case both market entry modes' expected market
entry time strictly increases in . Furthermore, since the productivity cut-os of both entry
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modes additionally depend on the respective variable and xed costs, the extent of their expected
market entry time adjustments diers due to dierent cost structures. An increase in  leads e.g.
















which is the case for all relative cost patterns below the diagonal line in gure 7. Figure 8
represents such a relative cost constellation where panel b) diers from panel a) only in . As a
result of the uncertainty increase, the expected market entry time is prolonged in both modes.




Finally, three crucial eects can be identied within the proximity-concentration trade-o frame-
work, associated with an increase in :
• An increase in the expected market entry times in both modes.
• An increase in the range of relative cost constellations in gure 7 favoring FDI as the optimal
market entry mode.
• A higher increase in the expected market entry time in the FDI mode.
As a consequence, market entry through FDI becomes more likely, but the likeliness of market
entry per period decreases due to postponement.
Result 5:
For IE < IF and wE
1
 > wF with  = 1, a rise in productivity volatility  increases the likelihood
of rst time market entry through FDI but prolongs the expected market entry time E(T
F). The
probability of rst time market entry in T decreases.
These comparative static ndings are compliant with the general real option literature according
to which uncertainty monotonically increases the market entry time (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
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However, the described relationship turns out to be idiosyncratic to linear prot functions. For
convex prot functions ( > 1) an increase in productivity uncertainty does not only aect the
optimal cut-o level negatively (increase in #
i) but additionally exhibits a countervailing eect.
In such a case, the expected prots of both market entry modes rise, due to Jensen's inequality
which reduces the optimal cut-o levels #
i. This positive adjustment is captured by the partial




=    2 < 0: (81)
which is monotonically decreasing in . The intuition for this eect is that an investor can
expect higher prots associated with productivity changes and as a consequence the adjusted
discount rate increases the costs of waiting if  increases. Therefore, for  > 1 the total impact









































due to the negative eect in 0
u.16
For specic parameter values, Jensen's inequality dominates the total eect of an increase in
uncertainty and for such cases the expected market entry time can decrease. Plotting the expected
market entry time with respect to  results therefore, in a u-shaped function (gure 9).
Dierently expressed, for low levels of uncertainty the expected market entry time in both modes
decrease whereas for high levels of uncertainty, a shift in  increases E(T
i ). Figure 9 shows that
for high productivity growth rates  the likeliness of a decrease in the expected market entry time
is higher than in cases with low growth rates. Technically, the range of values in which E(T
i )
decreases in  becomes bigger the higher the growth rate is (0 < 1, in gure 9). The intuition
for this result is that companies associated with high growth rates may appreciate a certain
extent of productivity uncertainty and enter the market earlier. Whereas, rms confronted with
16A detailed analysis can be found in Wong (2007).












Figure 9: Expected Market Entry Time Pattern
low growth rates tend to dislike uncertainty and postpone their investment decision further into
the future the higher the volatility.
Finally, within the proximity-concentration trade-o framework, a reduction of the expected
market entry time due to an increase in  is still accompanied by a rise in the range of relative
cost constellations in gure 7 which enforce FDI as the optimal entry strategy. Additionally, one
can conclude that for a rm associated with a high productivity growth rate, a rise in uncertainty
may lead to an earlier market entry.
Result 6:
For IE < IF and wE
1
 > wF with  > 1, a rise in productivity volatility  increases the likelihood
of rst time market entry through FDI. There exists a range of uncertainty 0 <  < 0 in which
the market entry is preponed. For these parameter constellations the likeliness of market entry
per period increases.
5 The Degree of Competition and Comparative Statics
A crucial aspect for an investor's rst time market entry decision is the degree of competition in
the potential destination country. Within the established framework we can measure the extent
of competition by considering the inverse of the country specic mark-up . Demand turns out
to be at if  approaches one. In such a case, the investor holds a low degree of market power as
the substitutability between the dierentiated goods Xi is high.
36Uncertain Productivity Growth 5 COMPETITION & COMPARATIVE STATICS

















































(a) Country A (Low Competition)
A = 0:75















































(b) Country B (High Competition)
B = 0:9































(c) Degree of Competition & Relative Cost Patterns
Figure 10: Competition Eects
Figure 10 depicts the export and FDI value functions in two dierent countries. The investor is
confronted with exactly the same cost patterns in both foreign markets.17 The only dierence
appears in the degree of competition, with country A exhibiting a lower competition between
the dierentiated goods Xi than country B (A < B). In the low competition case, the given
relative cost pattern leads to an export productivity cut-o #
El which is lower than the FDI
cut-o. Simultaneously, given the degree of competition, the upper envelope function in panel
a) turns out to be dominated by the option and investment value function of the export mode.
Assuming that the initial productivity level #0 is below #
El, the investor will denitely serve the
17In both markets the investor is confronted with the following cost structure:
IE
IF = 2; = 1:3; = 0:5;
wF
wE = 1;r =
0:06; = 0:02; = 0:01:
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low competition country via exports. Based on these equilibrium results it can be concluded that
the prevailing relative cost pattern must lie below the continuous line in panel c) as it depicts the
only range of relative cost constellations for which the export mode represents a relevant entry
mode.
Panel b) in gure 10 illustrates that a higher degree of competition on the alternative foreign
market turns out to be accompanied by two adjustments. The rst eect of an increased com-
petition, is a decrease in both productivity cut-os #
i. Due to the particular cost assumptions
within the proximity-concentration trade-o framework the FDI mode's cut-o reduction turns









Compliant with the general economic intuition, an investor enters the more competitive market
depicted in panel b) at lower productivity levels and therefore, implicitly at an earlier expected
time. However, there exists a second eect which arises in the presence of higher competition.
All value functions in panel b) increase in their convexity but the rise in the FDI mode's option







As a consequence of the disproportionate increase of the FDI mode's option and investment values
the upper envelope in panel b) is only composed of FDI related functions. Panel c) represents in a
further way the stronger increase of the FDI mode's option value. The dotted curve represents all
relative cost constellations in country B for which the option values of both market entry modes
are equal. The continuous line represents the same relationship but corresponds to country A.
Technically, a rise in the degree of competition increases the range of relative cost patterns in
panel c) which enforce rst time market entry through FDI. In the underlying example the in-
vestor will serve country B through a foreign plant due to the higher competition. The intuition
for this second eect is as follows. Besides an earlier market entry, a higher degree of competition
necessitates a higher productivity in order to survive in the market. Since the marginal costs in
the FDI mode are lower than in the export mode and since their impact on the prots dominate
in the long run, FDI turns out to become more likely the higher the degree of competition.
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Result 7:
For IE < IF, wE
1
 > wF and  >  > 0, a rise in the degree of competition (rise in ) decreases
the expected market entry time E(T
i ) and, also the optimal cut-os #
i. Simultaneously, the
likeliness of market entry through FDI increases.
Finally, table 1 summarizes the eects of remaining parameters.
Probability Probability





Transport Costs:  " " # " - " -
Variable Costs (Home): wE " " # " - " -
Variable Costs (Foreign): wF " # " - " - "
Fixed costs (Export): IE " " # " - " -
Fixed costs (FDI): IF " # " - " - "
Table 1: Summary of Comparative Statics
All adjustments which appear due to marginal changes in these parameters can be derived from
gure 7. An increase e.g. in transport costs  leads to a reallocation in the relative cost space to
the left which is dominated by cost constellations enforcing FDI as the optimal rst time market
entry mode.
Since the derived graph includes both, the parameters of dynamic aspects and static costs, it is
a convenient tool to visualize the eects of uncertain productivity growth within the proximity-
concentration trade-o framework and their impact on the optimal market entry mode.
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6 Conclusion
Whether rms serve a new foreign market through exports or horizontal FDI has become a fron-
tier research eld in international economics. Major contributions have been conducted under the
umbrella of the New New Trade Theory where the seminal work by Helpman et al. (2004) paved
the way for dierent analyses. In the tradition of international economics these models are framed
as static general equilibrium models and perform empirically very well (Helpman, 2006). A major
result within this strand of literature is that rms serving a foreign market through export tend
to be less productive than those entering the market through horizontal FDI. Furthermore, a
higher productivity dispersion within a sector seems to increase the share of FDI entrants.
One neglected aspect within these models are dynamic elements, in particular the fact that pro-
ductivity growth is a continuous stochastic variable. The question e.g. whether volatile produc-
tivity growth might have a selection eect on market entry modes over time can not be answered.
On the other hand from a rm perspective, productivity is a dynamic decision variable accounted
for by decision takers. CEOs of multinational enterprises have certain expectations on their com-
panies' productivity development and try to optimize their market entry modes intertemporally.
Empirically, a boost in FDI could be observed especially in the mid 1980 and 1990 (UNCTAD,
2008) associated with disproportional growth in rm productivity due to information technol-
ogy (IT) improvements. Given these observations and the lack of dynamic models accounting
for timing eects, the underlying model elaborates market entry choice of a multinational rm.
By combining the proximity-concentration trade-o framework with the real option methodology
several results are derived which contribute to the existing literature. Within the assumed specic
costs patterns productivity growth turns out to favor FDI as the optimal market entry strategy.
The higher the productivity growth rate is the more likely is a rm to enter the new foreign
market as a foreign direct investor. Since productivity growth is a volatile process (Baily et al.
2001) the model accounts for uncertainty. A riskier productivity growth turns out to increase
the likeliness of market entry through FDI even further. This result coincides with the New New
Trade Theory ndings where sectors with a higher productivity distortion exhibit higher FDI
shares. Finally the model oers the possibility to quantify the rst time market entry time given
an uncertain growth rate. The crucial result of the model is that both productivity growth and
uncertainty increase the likeliness of market entry as foreign direct investor.
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